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Abstract
This paper explores and compares the effectiveness of Minimum Income (MI) schemes in protecting persons 
of working age from poverty in the European Union. Using the European microsimulation model EUROMOD 
we estimate indicators of coverage and adequacy of MI schemes in 14 EU countries. In terms of coverage, we 
ﬁ  nd that in several countries a signiﬁ  cant number of individuals are ineligible for MI even when they fall below 
a poverty line set at 40 per cent of median income. With respect to adequacy, we show that in certain countries a 
large fraction of those entitled to MI remain at very low levels of income even when MI beneﬁ  t is added. Overall, 
our ﬁ  ndings suggest that the clustering of MI schemes in Europe may be more complex than previous literature 
has hitherto allowed for.
Keywords
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1.  Introduction
The alleviation of poverty (at least, in the form of extreme poverty) is a common objective of all welfare states. 
The corrosive implications of poverty (be it to “the fabric of society” or, more prosaically, political stability) may 
be one of the few concerns that are common across political philosophies. As a result, difﬁ  cult though it may be 
to deﬁ  ne the “European social model”, there can be little doubt that it encompasses the need to guarantee a decent 
minimum standard of living for all. This idea is reﬂ  ected in works of scholarship. For instance, Baldwin (1990) de-
ﬁ  ned Marshall’s concept of social citizenship as ‘full membership of community’, premised on a ‘kind of basic hu-
man equality’ that, while tolerating differences of class and wealth, guaranteed each a minimum standard, regard-
less of the hand dealt by fate, biology and society” (Baldwin, 1990, p.4; Marshall, 1950; see also Ringen, 1987). 
Naturally, just how different welfare states attempt to alleviate poverty differs greatly. Esping-Andersen 
(1990) famously distinguished between three “welfare regimes”: Anglo-Saxon liberal, Continental corporatist 
and Scandinavian social-democratic. While his analysis rested on a comparison of pensions and unemployment 
beneﬁ  ts rather than of social assistance, he did elaborate on the much greater reliance of the liberal welfare regime 
on means-tested beneﬁ  ts.
From a different perspective, Korpi and Palme (1998) addressed the question of whether social policies ought 
to be targeted to low-income groups. They identiﬁ  ed ﬁ  ve different “ideal types of institutional structures”, in order 
of historical appearance. These are the targeted, voluntary-subsidized, corporatist, basic security, and encompass-
ing models. The targeted model relies heavily on means testing, although that can be used to exclude the rich (as in 
Australia) rather than strictly to include the poor. The voluntary-subsidized model was in many European countries 
the precursor to the corporatist model, where social insurance is compulsory, even though still organised along 
occupational lines. The basic security model resembles the original Beveridge design, with more comprehensive 
ﬂ  at-rate beneﬁ  ts, and low ceilings on earning-related ones, on the assumption that higher-income groups will turn 
to the market and private insurance. Finally, the encompassing model combines generous citizenship-based uni-
versal programmes with earnings-related beneﬁ  ts for the economically active population (1998, pp.667-9). Korpi 
and Palme went on to formulate the “paradox of equality”: since redistributive budgets are not ﬁ  xed, but depend on 
welfare state institutions, and since there seems to be a trade-off between the size of redistributive budgets and the 
extent of targeting, “the more we target beneﬁ  ts at the poor, (…) the less likely we are to reduce poverty” (1998, 
pp.681-2).Page • 10
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The work of Gough et al. (1997, pp. 36-7) is more directly relevant to the question of minimum income pro-
tection. The authors analysed social assistance in OECD countries, identifying eight regimes. Three of these con-
cerned English-speaking countries. In welfare states with integrated safety-nets (Ireland, Britain, Canada), social 
assistance was institutionalized nationally and beneﬁ  ts are generous. In selective welfare states (Australia, New 
Zealand), almost all social beneﬁ  ts were categorical and means-tested, but also relatively generous and nation-
ally integrated. In the rather exceptional case of the United States, welfare beneﬁ  ts were low and work incentives 
punitive. Japan is another unique case, with centralized but discretionary social assistance. On the other hand, in 
continental European countries (France, Belgium, Germany) dual systems of social assistance prevailed, with cat-
egorical programmes combined with general safety nets of last resort. However, in Austria and Switzerland (and 
Norway) poverty relief was local and discretionary, with relatively high beneﬁ  ts but few beneﬁ  ciaries. In Scandi-
navian countries (except Norway) and the Netherlands, social assistance was citizenship-based and residual, with 
a general scheme providing generous beneﬁ  ts, but occupying a marginal role within social security. Finally, in 
Southern Europe (including Turkey), social assistance was rudimentary, usually involving categorical schemes for 
the elderly with local discretionary relief for other groups, beneﬁ  ts were low and coverage was limited (see also 
Gough 2001, p.165).
The focus of this paper is on Minimum Income (MI) schemes, which represent the ultimate safety net in pro-
tecting individuals of working age from poverty. Minimum income protection in Europe has a long pedigree, going 
back to the British Poor Law (1601), amended in 1834, and ﬁ  nally abolished with the introduction of the National 
Assistance Act in 1948 (Barr, 2004). Similar legislation was passed in other European countries after World War II, 
introducing Social Bistand in Denmark (1961), Sozialhilfe in Germany (1962), Algemene Bijstand in the Nether-
lands (1963), Socialbidrag in Sweden and so on. In French-speaking countries progress was slower, with Minimex 
introduced in Belgium in 1974, followed by Revenue Minimum d’Insertion (RMI) in France in 1988 (Guibentif 
and Bouget, 1997). The successful launch of RMI set in motion developments that led to the adoption of similar 
schemes throughout southern Europe. In Spain, Basque Country put in place its own scheme in 1988, Catalonia in 
1990, other regions soon after. In Portugal, a national pilot scheme was introduced in 1996 and became fully op-
erational in 1997 as Rendimento Mínimo Garantido (RMG). In Italy, a formal experiment was started in 1998 and 
extended further in 2000, before it was terminated in 2003 (Matsaganis et al., 2003). On the other hand, Central 
and Eastern European countries moved swiftly since the early 1990s to creating social safety nets, even though in 
some cases minimum income protection is only provided at very low levels (Rat, 2009).Page • 11
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MI schemes provide cash beneﬁ  ts intended to guarantee a minimum level of support when other incomes 
(from the market, from other cash beneﬁ  ts, or of other family members) are insufﬁ  cient. In effect, the level of 
income of a person in receipt of MI is the minimum level of income deemed acceptable for that type of person by 
the social protection system in that country. Interest in MI has been recently strengthened by a resolution of the 
European Parliament. The resolution, passed on 20 October 2010, acknowledges MI schemes as a key instrument 
in combating poverty, and encourages Member States to take a fresh look at policies to foster social integration and 
to guarantee an adequate standard of living (European Parliament, 2010).
Although MI schemes are usually viewed as an integral part of the European social model (Pestieau, 2006), a 
comprehensive empirical assessment of their effectiveness in the EU is still lacking. Recent contributions (Bahle 
et al. 2010; Immervoll, 2010; Nelson, 2010; Van Mechelen et al., 2011), typically based on institutional data 
measuring the level of social assistance for a limited number of stylised family types, sometimes supplemented by 
information on the number of recipients, review and update the available evidence, and thereby offer important in-
sights into the role of minimum income schemes in alleviating poverty. Nevertheless, important questions remain 
unanswered or even unaddressed.
The ﬁ  rst question is about coverage. How many of those in poverty are entitled to MI? Are those not covered 
by MI excluded by design, or due to some administrative failure? Recipient statistics provide interesting informa-
tion, yet cannot answer this question because they mix up two different issues: entitlement rules and targeting 
errors. Non take up implies that some individuals will not receive MI beneﬁ  t even though they are theoretically 
eligible for it. The opposite may also be the case: some other individuals will receive MI beneﬁ  t (and will show up 
in the data as MI recipients) even though they are theoretically ineligible for it. On the other hand, eligibility rules 
may exclude some groups a priori, even when they are poor (and could include some other groups even when they 
are not poor). Looking at recipient numbers alone will confuse rather than clarify these separate issues, and this 
would still be the case even if data on recipient numbers were complete and directly comparable across countries 
(which, as the above and other studies have shown, they are not). Entitlement rules and targeting errors are both 
important issues. However, since they originate from different problems and call for different policy responses, 
they deserve to be analysed separately. While recent research has shed light on targeting errors (Hernanz et al., 
2004), little is known about the nature and extent of exclusion from minimum income protection by design (i.e. 
because of entitlement rules).Page • 12
Francesco Figari, Manos Matsaganis and Holly Sutherland
The second question is about adequacy. Is the value of MI beneﬁ  ts sufﬁ  cient to lift recipients above a given 
poverty threshold? The “model family” calculations provided by the studies cited above are certainly informative. 
Nevertheless, recipients of social assistance in real life often combine MI with other social beneﬁ  ts (e.g. housing 
beneﬁ  ts, family allowances) and, in some cases, with income from other sources as well. These incomes interact 
with each other (and with income taxes, and with social contributions) in complex ways. Even with the best of 
intentions, encapsulating the complexity of real life within the “model family” approach is extremely difﬁ  cult, if 
not practically impossible. Moreover, differences in deﬁ  nitions have also hampered comparative analysis: while in 
some countries extra support for dependent children or housing costs is already included in the MI scheme being 
analysed, in other countries it is provided under separate schemes. Again, adopting the “model family” approach 
involves the difﬁ  culty of having to decide what to include under MI and what not. For both reasons, the compara-
tive analysis of the effectiveness of MI schemes in alleviating poverty ought to take into account their interaction 
with the rest of the tax-beneﬁ  t system, and focus on the entire range of public assistance while on MI rather than 
on the MI beneﬁ  t alone.
This paper is an attempt to ﬁ  ll the gap left by existing studies as discussed above. We jointly consider coverage 
and adequacy of MI schemes. On the one hand, we compare the level of income while on MI (rather than the level 
of MI beneﬁ  t alone), and take into account the interaction of MI with the rest of the tax-beneﬁ  t system. On the 
other hand, we clearly separate the impact of targeting errors from that of entitlement rules, focusing on the latter. 
Our research, based on the microsimulation approach, aims to complement the ﬁ  ndings of “model family” studies.
Incidentally, the paper sheds some light on the actual diversity of MI schemes across Europe, thereby engag-
ing with recent debates on the degree of convergence in terms of social protection (Caminada et al., 2010; Nelson, 
2008), and on the scope for harmonisation of minimum income schemes in the EU (Gough, 2001; European Parlia-
ment, 2010). We return to these issues towards the end of this paper.
The paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, which places our research in the context of the 
literature, section 2 discusses the scope of MI schemes and issues of cross-country comparability, and describes 
the advantages of the methodology used relative to other approaches. Section 3 presents our ﬁ  ndings in terms of 
coverage and adequacy of MI schemes. Finally, section 4 concludes with a summary of results and a discussion of 
their policy implications.Page • 13
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2.  Methodology 
The scope of “MI schemes” is not easy to deﬁ  ne in a way that is both meaningful and consistent across 
countries (Bahle et al., 2010; Immervoll, 2010). As pointed out by Adema (2006), comparing spending on social 
assistance across countries is fraught with difﬁ  culties. The same applies to the cash component of such schemes, 
the “MI beneﬁ  t”. In some countries (e.g. France, Germany and Spain), means-tested unemployment assistance op-
erates as an intermediate stage between contributory unemployment insurance and general social assistance. This 
contrasts with most countries where the MI also functions as unemployment assistance beneﬁ  t. Furthermore, MI 
beneﬁ  ts are often complemented by separate means-tested housing beneﬁ  ts, which make an important contribution 
to the minimum income package. Elsewhere, (e.g. Germany, Estonia, the Netherlands and Poland), the MI scheme 
itself covers housing assistance. Also, in most countries the MI beneﬁ  t is intended to cover the basic needs of all 
family/household members. But in some cases (e.g. in the UK) the MI scheme is only intended to cover the needs 
of some family members (adults), whereas the needs of other members (children) are addressed by other beneﬁ  ts. 
Finally, additional beneﬁ  ts (such as one-off grants for the purchase of necessary durables, social care, employment 
support and other “social reintegration” services) can either be “passported” (i.e. eligibility is automatic when in 
receipt of MI), or an integral part of MI, or must be applied for separately.
In this paper we deal with issues of comparability, avoiding the need to make ad hoc (often arbitrary) decisions 
when considering what to include under MI and what not, as follows.
We ﬁ  rst take the schemes listed as “Minimum resources: general non-contributory minimum” in the Mutual 
Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC) database1, a source of valuable information on social protec-
tion in Europe, used extensively in cross-country comparisons (e.g. Nelson, 2007). The schemes are listed in Table 
1. We use the MISSOC deﬁ  nition to identify those entitled for MI in each country.
1 See the MISSOC website (http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/missoc_en.htm).Page • 14
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Table 1 Characteristics of Minimum Income schemes in 14 EU countries
Belgium Denmark Germany Estonia France Luxembourg Netherlands
title of scheme Droit a la 
l’integration sociale
Kontant-hjælp; 








family individual family household family Household family
lowest age for 
claiming
18 18 none none 25 25 23
seeking work yes yes yes yes yes Yes yes
other condi-
tions
none none none none none not left work 
voluntarily none
disregards some earnings
some assets some 
earn.
invalidity benefit
























taxable n oy e sn on on oN o n o
Austria Poland Portugal Slovenia Finland Sweden UK




Toimeentulotuki Ekonomiskt bistand Income Support
assessment 
unit
family household household household family Family family
lowest age for 
claiming
no age limits 18 18 18 in practice 18 or 
over
no age limit 18
seeking work yes yes for periodic 
allowance
yes yes yes Yes yes unless exempt
other condi-
tions
none none be available for 
training

























housing supplement child tax credit
housing benefit
council tax benefit
taxable no no no no no no
Notes:  Belgium: age is 18 unless the claimant is married, pregnant or a parent, in which case he or she can be younger. Denmark: as-
sessment unit is individual unless married; seeking work is required unless the claimant has a partner who is already working. 
Germany: family allowances are disregarded only for families with 3 or more children. Austria: here the household is used as the 
assessment unit. Luxembourg: age is 25, unless the claimant is disabled, unable to work, or looking after a child. Netherlands: age 
is 23, but can be reduced by the municipality to 21 or to 22 in special cases. Portugal: age is 18, but can be reduced for claimants 
who have a dependent child, are married or cohabiting. UK: age is 18, but can be reduced to 16 or to 17 in special cases
Sources:  EUROMOD Country Reports (http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod/resources-for-euromod-users/country-reports); MIS-
SOC table XI: ‘Guaranteeing Sufﬁ  cient Resources’ (http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/missoc_tables_en.htm).
We then calculate the total disposable income of those entitled for MI. This comprises all incomes, from all 
sources, of all household members. That obviously includes the MI beneﬁ  t itself, taking into account any income 
disregarded when assessing entitlement. Note that total disposable income is net of taxes and social contributions. 
Considering the entire range of resources available to those entitled for MI allows us to overcome the difﬁ  culty 
(common in many cross-country studies) of deﬁ  ning the scope of MI schemes in a comparable way.Page • 15
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MI schemes guarantee a level of income that varies by personal and household characteristics. Entitlement 
to MI is usually contingent on the exhaustion of all other social beneﬁ  ts, although in some cases the MI beneﬁ  t 
supplements other beneﬁ  ts when these are set below the guaranteed level of income. Generally, MI schemes 
require able-bodied recipients to be actively looking for work, and to participate in training or social integration 
programmes. MI schemes vary considerably in terms of eligibility conditions (e.g. related to age and residence), 
and in the extent of income disregards (e.g. small amounts of earnings or maintenance payments). As discussed 
above, MI schemes also differ in how they treat family and housing needs, and in how they are treated by the tax 
system. Finally, MI schemes differ in whether entitlement is assessed at the level of individual, household, or some 
other unit of assessment.
Not all European countries operate MI schemes. In Hungary, social assistance is organised at a local level. In 
Spain, where minimum income provision is the responsibility of regions, there are signiﬁ  cant variations between 
fully-ﬂ  edged MI schemes in some regions, and less ambitious local initiatives to support low incomes in other 
regions. In Italy, following the termination of the MI experiment, social assistance is provided at the discretion of 
municipal social services in some large cities. In Greece, no MI scheme exists at any level of government; emer-
gency assistance may be paid as a lump sum, and is limited to victims of natural disasters and other vulnerable 
groups. The remaining 23 EU member states operate national, non-discretionary MI schemes, even though in some 
(Austria, Germany, Finland) the minimum guaranteed level of income varies by region.
In fact, the level of income guaranteed is the most fundamental difference between MI schemes across the EU 
(Bahle et al., 2010). While in some countries the level of the minimum income guarantee is set in relative terms 
(e.g. as a proportion of the minimum wage or the social pension), in others it is deﬁ  ned in absolute terms (i.e. 
based on an assessment, at some point in time, of the cost of a range of basic needs such as food and clothing). As 
a result of the different approaches, reﬂ  ecting different policy priorities, the experience of “living on MI” varies 
considerably across Europe.
Our analysis adopts the microsimulation approach, using the European tax-beneﬁ  t model EUROMOD. The 
model simulates tax liabilities, social contributions and beneﬁ  t entitlements, applying the rules of each country’s 
tax-beneﬁ  t system on micro-data derived from income surveys (or, in a few cases, administrative registers). Origi-
nal incomes (such as earnings, capital income, transfers from other households), as well as policies that cannot 
be simulated (for example, contributory pensions) are taken directly from the data (Sutherland, 2007; Lietz and 
Mantovani, 2007).Page • 16
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EUROMOD is gradually being extended to all 27 EU member states. In this paper we analyse MI schemes 
in 14 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These are selected to represent all parts of Europe 
including the East, all three of Esping-Andersen’s welfare regimes, and all ﬁ  ve of Gough’s social assistance re-
gimes present in Europe2. The datasets used, the sample size, the data collection year, the income period and the 
policy year are all shown in Table 2.
Table 2: EUROMOD input datasets and simulated tax-benefit systems
Country Dataset Date of collec-
tion
Income period Policy rules Sample size 
(households)
Belgium EU-SILC 2006 annual 2005 2005 5,860
Denmark ECHP 1995 annual 1994 2001 3,215
Germany German Socio-Economic Panel Study 2002 annual 2001 2003 11,303
Estonia Household Budget Survey 2005 monthly 2005 2005 3,432
France Enquête sur les Budgets Familiaux (EBF) 2000/01 annual 2000/01 2001 10,305
Luxembourg Socio-Economic Panel (PSELL-2) 2001 annual 2000 2003 2,431
Netherlands Sociaal-economisch panelonderzoek 2000 annual 1999 2003 4,329
Austria Austrian version of ECHP 1998+1999 annual 1998 2003 2,674
Poland Household Budget Survey 2005 monthly 2005 2005 34,692
Portugal ECHP 2001 annual 2000 2003 4,588




annual 2004 2005 4,777
Finland Income distribution survey 2001 annual 2001 2003 10,736
Sweden Income distribution survey 2001 annual 2001 2001 14,610
UK Family Resources Survey (FRS) 2003/04 monthly 2003/04 2003 28,860
Notes:  EUROMOD data sources are the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) User Data Base and the EU Statistics on In-
comes and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) made available by Eurostat; the Austrian version of the ECHP made available by the Inter-
disciplinary Centre for Comparative Research in the Social Sciences; the Estonian Household Budget Survey (HBS) made available 
by Statistics Estonia; the Income Distribution Survey made available by Statistics Finland; the Enquête sur les Budgets Familiaux 
(EBF) made available by INSEE; the public-use version of the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) made available by 
the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin; the Socio-Economic Panel for Luxembourg (PSELL-2) made available 
by CEPS/INSTEAD; the Sociaal-economisch panelonderzoek (SEP) made available by Statistics Netherlands through the media-
tion of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientiﬁ  c Research – Scientiﬁ  c Statistical Agency; the Polish Household Budget Survey 
(HBS) made available by the Economic Department of Warsaw University; a sub-sample of Population Census merged with Per-
sonal income tax database, Pension database and Social transfers database, made available by the Statistical Ofﬁ  ce of Slovenia; 
the Income Distribution Survey made available by Statistics Sweden; and the Family Resources Survey (FRS), made available by 
the UK Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) through the Data Archive. Material from the FRS is Crown Copyright and is 
used with permission. Neither the DWP nor the Data Archive bears any responsibility for the analysis or interpretation of the data 
reported here. An equivalent disclaimer applies to all other data sources and their respective providers cited here.
We simulate entitlement to MI using all information available in the underlying datasets. Note that income 
surveys do not provide information on all eligibility conditions (e.g. citizenship, availability for work, assets). 
Moreover, in certain MI schemes some discretion operates at local level, which is also impossible to take into 
account with the information available. On the other hand, our simulation of MI entitlement is typically based on 
total incomes received during the year, while in real life entitlement is usually assessed on the basis of incomes 
2  Three social assistance types are excluded: the selective welfare states of Australia and New Zealand, and the exceptional cases of the 
US and Japan (Gough et al., 1997; Gough 2001).Page • 17
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received in a much shorter period (e.g. a month). To the extent that incomes ﬂ  uctuate over the year, this will cause 
us to miss some individuals entitled for MI for part of the year. Our analysis focuses on the intended coverage of 
MI schemes, abstracting from targeting errors.
In this paper, we focus on working age individuals and the households in which they live. “Working age” is 
deﬁ  ned as age 16 to 64 (inclusive), excluding those in full-time education. The share of this group in the population 
is quite similar in most countries, ranging from 56 to 61 per cent.
Most comparative studies of social assistance examine aggregate expenditure data, while micro-level com-
parisons of MI schemes tend to rely on calculations of their effects on stylised households using the “model fam-
ily” approach (Gough et al., 1997; Adema, 2006; Frazer and Marlier, 2009; Immervoll, 2010; Nelson, 2010; van 
Mechelen et al. 2011).
The “model family” approach is transparent and parsimonious (in the sense that it needs little information 
other than guaranteed amounts by family type, plus median income or minimum wage by country). However, it 
also has a number of limitations. To start with, the focus on particular family types ignores others that may be 
equally important. In particular, extended households including more than one nuclear family are usually entirely 
neglected. Moreover, it cannot directly account for the fact that some types are more common in some countries 
than others. For example, lone parent households are much more prevalent in the Scandinavian countries and in 
the UK, while three-generation households are more common in Southern and Eastern Europe. This failure to ac-
count for differences in the population share of each family type from country to country leaves readers with no 
clear picture of the effect of social assistance and MI schemes on income redistribution and poverty alleviation.
Furthermore, as explained in the introduction, the “model family” approach cannot always reproduce the 
complex ways in which MI entitlements interact with other social beneﬁ  ts, with income from other sources, with 
income taxes, and with social contributions. Nor can it easily deal with differences in the scope of MI schemes, 
having to rely on ad hoc decisions of what to include under MI and what not.
Arguably, the microsimulation approach avoids all of these pitfalls. First of all, using micro-data allows the 
full range of relevant individual and household circumstances to be reﬂ  ected in the analysis (Marlier et al., 2007), 
and to capture the impact of MI schemes on recipients’ income (Holsch and Kraus, 2006; Avram, 2009).
In addition, microsimulation has further advantages over the direct analysis of micro-data. For instance, MI 
schemes are rarely identiﬁ  ed as such in income surveys. Even though the most widely used of such surveys, the 
European Union Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), does contain a “social assistance” variable, Page • 18
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this is not strictly comparable across countries as different beneﬁ  ts have been aggregated under the same heading3. 
Since EUROMOD simulates each policy instrument (and indeed, each component of each instrument) separately, 
variables are disaggregated – and can even be “customised” as is appropriate for a particular analysis.
As mentioned earlier, the assessment unit for entitlement to MI differs in each country: in some cases it is 
wider than the (nuclear) family but narrower than the household. Ignoring such differences while at the same 
time assuming (as usual) that income is equally shared within households will distort estimates of distributional 
effects. EUROMOD deals with this problem by carefully simulating MI entitlements in a manner consistent with 
programme rules in each country.
Finally, there is evidence that social beneﬁ  ts are often under-reported in income surveys (Lynn et al. 2004, 
Meyer et al. 2009). In particular, respondents on very low incomes tend to under-report receipt of beneﬁ  ts, either 
because they fail to recall a particular beneﬁ  t altogether, or because they misplace in time or misclassify some of 
the beneﬁ  ts received, or because they consciously suppress the relevant information because of stigma (Lynn et al. 
2004). Notably, under-reporting plagues attempts to estimate the extent of beneﬁ  t take up. Again, our analysis gets 
round this problem by focusing on the extent and incidence of non-entitlement rather than non-receipt as a whole. 
Speciﬁ  cally, by focusing on entitlement rules we can estimate the proportion in each country of those excluded 
from MI by design, even when their income falls below a given poverty threshold.
3  To give a few examples, the EU-SILC “social assistance” variable includes Working Tax Credit in the UK, Unemployment Assistance 
in Slovenia, and Social Pension and Pensioners’ Social Solidarity Beneﬁ  t in Greece. None of these beneﬁ  ts form part of the MI scheme 
in the UK and Slovenia, while no MI scheme exists in Greece. For an overview of EU-SILC, see Atkinson and Marlier (2010). Note that 
the problem of non-comparability of aggregate variables in survey data applies to some extent to all cross-national datasets, including 
the Luxembourg Income Study (Smeeding, 2002).Page • 19
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3.  Results
We  ﬁ  rst address coverage. What proportion of the population in poverty is entitled to MI? We deﬁ  ne 
“poverty” by reference to two different poverty lines: the “standard poverty” line of 60 per cent of median equiva-
lent income, and the “extreme poverty” line of 40 per cent of median equivalent income. For each poverty line, 
Tables 3 and 4 show the share of working age population falling, according to our estimates, into one of the fol-
lowing ﬁ  ve categories:
(a). not entitled to MI, poor;
(b.) entitled to MI, poor with MI;
(c.) entitled to MI, not poor with MI, poor without MI;
(d.) entitled to MI, not poor with MI, not poor without MI;
(e.) not entitled to MI, not poor.
The coverage rate4 is deﬁ  ned as the sum of those entitled to MI who are either poor or would have been poor 
in the absence of MI, divided by the population in poverty – in other words: (b) + (c) / (a) + (b) + (c).
Table 3: Distribution of population by MI entitlement and poverty status (at 60% of median)
not entitled to MI; 
poor
entitled to MI; 
poor with MI
entitled to MI; not 
poor with MI; poor 
without MI
entitled to MI; 
not poor with or 
without MI
not entitled to MI; 
not poor
coverage rate
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (b)+(c) /
(a)+ (b)+(c)
Belgium 6.29 1.95 0.98 2.99 87.78 31.80%
Denmark 5.54 0.15 1.07 0.32 92.92 18.04%
Germany 8.66 2.23 0.35 0.19 88.57 22.94%
Estonia 11.12 5.62 0.09 0.01 83.17 33.90%
France 7.79 1.33 1.32 1.76 87.80 25.33%
Luxembourg 4.11 4.41 1.12 0.22 90.14 57.38%
Netherlands 7.64 2.36 0.85 0.38 88.77 29.58%
Austria 6.20 1.27 0.02 0.00 92.51 17.31%
Poland 4.75 11.69 1.13 3.89 78.54 72.98%
Portugal 9.86 5.73 0.01 0.01 84.39 36.77%
Slovenia 8.12 5.96 0.16 0.01 85.76 42.95%
Finland 5.12 3.96 0.77 5.09 85.05 48.02%
Sweden 4.26 2.59 1.32 1.04 90.79 47.91%
UK 7.66 5.81 3.02 3.35 80.15 53.56%
Notes:  The population of interest is individuals aged 16 to 64 (inclusive), excluding people in current full-time education, living in the 
relevant assessment unit (if entitled to MI). The sample size of those entitled to MI below a poverty line at 60% of median is small 
in Denmark and Austria.
Source:  Own calculations using EUROMOD.
4  Note that, in addition to the coverage rate, Tables 3 and 4 can be used to compute other indicators. For instance (b) +  (c) + (d) is the 
entitlement rate (the number of individuals of working age entitled to MI as a proportion of the population in working age), (a) + (b) is 
the counterfactual poverty rate of the population of working age assuming full take up of MI entitlements etc.Page • 20
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With respect to the standard poverty line, the coverage rate ranges widely: from around 20 per cent in Austria 
and Denmark to around 70 per cent in Poland. In Belgium, Slovenia, Estonia, Portugal, the UK, Finland, Sweden 
and Luxembourg large proportions of those in poverty are entitled to MI. In contrast, in France, the Netherlands 
and Germany coverage is relatively low. Note that lack of entitlement may either be due to categorical conditions, 
or due to the fact that the threshold for entitlement of a given MI scheme is set below the standard poverty line of 
60 per cent of median equivalent income.
Furthermore, the proportion of those entitled to MI who are not poor when receiving MI but would have been 
poor in the absence of MI (c) is only substantial in France, Sweden and the UK.
Conversely, the proportion of those entitled to MI who are not poor when receiving MI and would not have 
been poor in the absence of MI (d) is particularly relevant in Finland, Belgium and Poland and the UK. Note that 
the size of (d) may depend on a number of factors. The OECD modiﬁ  ed equivalence scale used here in the calcula-
tion of poverty risk and the implicit “equivalence scale” by which the amount of MI beneﬁ  t is adjusted for depend-
ants may differ. Additional needs of e.g. a disabled dependant may be taken into account in assessing eligibility 
for (and in determining the level of) MI beneﬁ  t, but they are ignored in the OECD modiﬁ  ed equivalence scale. 
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, if the assessment unit of MI schemes is narrower than the household, MI recipients 
will be sharing resources with people in the same household but outside the assessment unit.
Table 4: Distribution of population by MI entitlement and poverty status (at 40% of median)
not entitled to MI; 
poor
entitled to MI; 
poor with MI
entitled to MI; not 
poor with MI; poor 
without MI
entitled to MI; 
not poor with or 
without MI
not entitled to MI; 
not poor
coverage rate
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (b)+(c) /
(a)+ (b)+(c)
 Belgium 0.05 0.71 1.05 4.16 94.02 97.00%
Denmark 1.99 0.02 0.96 0.56 96.47 33.03%
Germany 1.95 0.44 1.42 0.92 95.28 48.65%
Estonia 2.60 3.95 1.07 0.69 91.69 65.89%
France 0.74 0.53 0.78 3.09 94.86 63.74%
Luxembourg 0.18 0.11 2.25 3.39 94.07 93.10%
Netherlands 1.45 0.24 2.02 1.33 94.96 61.03%
Austria 0.89 0.77 0.40 0.12 97.81 56.83%
Poland 0.63 3.89 2.21 10.61 82.66 90.60%
Portugal 0.56 3.49 1.70 0.56 93.69 90.20%
Slovenia 0.72 2.89 2.46 0.78 93.16 88.19%
Finland 1.39 0.05 2.42 2.49 93.66 63.97%
Sweden 0.55 0.58 1.00 8.24 89.63 74.28%
UK 2.40 0.86 4.20 7.12 85.41 67.83%
Notes:  The population of interest is individuals aged 16 to 64 (inclusive), excluding people in current full-time education, living in the 
relevant assessment unit (if entitled to MI). The sample size of those entitled to MI below a poverty line at 40% of median is small 
in Denmark, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria and Sweden.
Source:  Own calculations using EUROMOD.Page • 21
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As might be expected, coverage of MI improves with respect to a lower poverty line of 40 per cent of median 
equivalent income. In Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark and Sweden extreme poverty is low 
(under 2 per cent). The share of the extremely poor entitled to MI is high in Slovenia, Belgium, Poland, Portugal, 
Finland and Luxembourg. Nevertheless, in certain countries (France, Austria, Sweden, Germany, the UK, Estonia, 
Denmark and the Netherlands) sizeable proportions of the extremely poor are not entitled to MI. Again, lack of 
entitlement may either be due to categorical conditions, or due to the fact that the threshold for entitlement of a 
given MI scheme is set below the extreme poverty line of 40 per cent of median equivalent income.
Should the exclusion of poor persons of working age from MI be attributed to categorical conditions, or to 
low income thresholds? One way to answer the question is to establish whether the entitlement rate rises signiﬁ  -
cantly as income falls. That it does not is prima facie evidence for the presence of categorical conditions limiting 
eligibility to MI. Our calculations (available from the authors on request) show that this is likely to be the case in 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and the UK.
Let us now turn to adequacy. Opinions as to what level of income should be deemed adequate differ (Frazer 
and Marlier, 2009). Recently, the European Parliament afﬁ  rmed that “adequate MI schemes must set minimum 
income at a level equivalent to at least 60 per cent of median income” (European Parliament, 2010). International 
studies of MI schemes tend to compare the MI beneﬁ  t for “model families” with median income or average earn-
ings (Immervoll, 2010; Nelson 2010). Instead, as explained earlier, our approach is twofold. First, we consider 
the entire disposable income of those entitled to MI, rather than the level of MI beneﬁ  t alone. Then, we analyse 
the distribution of those entitled to MI by level of income, rather than simply calculate their average disposable 
income. The results are shown in Table 5.Page • 22
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Table 5: Distribution of working age individuals entitled to MI by level of income
equivalent income of those entitled to MI as a proportion of the median
< 40%  40% < 50%  50% < 60%  60% < 70%  70% < 80%  80%
Belgium 12.02 12.26 8.73 7.22 8.58 51.19
Denmark 1.40 3.99 4.57 26.90 28.33 34.81
Germany 15.76 25.02 39.73 11.01 3.83 4.65
Estonia 69.15 20.54 8.59 0.84 0.88 0.00
France 11.98 6.11 12.11 23.71 14.36 31.73
Luxembourg 1.87 25.00 49.74 16.49 3.93 2.98
Netherlands 6.71 11.40 47.59 19.63 5.80 8.88
Austria 59.64 33.43 5.17 1.76 0.00 0.00
Poland 23.29 25.04 21.65 11.29 5.38 13.36
Portugal 60.69 37.12 1.85 0.11 0.00 0.23
Slovenia 47.17 39.77 10.33 2.73 0.00 0.00
Finland 5.90 17.31 17.13 11.51 11.25 36.89
Sweden 0.96 11.01 40.41 22.18 8.92 16.52
UK 7.05 17.98 22.69 15.94 10.89 25.45
Notes:  Figures refer to various years (see Table 1). Working age individuals on MI are individuals aged 16 to 64 (inclusive), excluding 
people in current full-time education, living in the assessment unit as deﬁ  ned by each MI scheme. The equivalent income of those 
entitled to MI includes the MI beneﬁ  t to which they are entitled.
Source:  Own calculations using EUROMOD.
In some countries large numbers of working age individuals live on very low incomes even when eligible for 
MI. In Estonia, Austria and Portugal over 60 per cent of those entitled to MI fail to reach 40 per cent of median 
income. In Slovenia the relevant share is nearly 50 per cent. Conversely, in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France 
and the UK relatively high proportions of those entitled to MI have household incomes well clear of the poverty 
line (e.g. above 80 per cent of median). In all of these countries the assessment unit for MI is narrower than the 
household, making it less unlikely that those entitled to MI live in households with relatively high income.
In countries with a high entitlement rate (Poland, the UK, Finland Belgium), and also in France, the relevant 
population appears to be rather evenly distributed by income. Elsewhere (Germany, the Netherlands and Luxem-
bourg), MI seems designed to bring most recipients to between 40 and 60 per cent of median income. In some 
other countries (Estonia, Austria, Portugal and Slovenia), MI is closely targeted at those with low incomes, but its 
adequacy is generally low.
Plotting coverage against adequacy produces Figures 1 and 2 (for the two poverty lines at 60 and 40 per cent 
of median equivalent income respectively).Page • 23
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Figure 1: Coverage and adequacy of MI schemes in the EU (poverty line at 60% median)
Notes:   Coverage rates from Table 3. The adequacy rate is the proportion of working age individuals entitled to MI with equivalent income 
equal or greater than 60% of the median (Table 5). Correlation coefﬁ  cient = -0.089; p-value = 0.761; no. of observations = 14.
Judging the effectiveness of MI schemes against the standard poverty benchmark (at 60 per cent of median) 
reveals no clear pattern. Denmark, France and Belgium score high on adequacy but low on coverage. Poland and 
Luxembourg score high on coverage but less so on adequacy. Austria, followed by Germany and (to a lesser ex-
tent) the Netherlands score low on both counts. Estonia, Portugal and Slovenia do as poorly as Austria in terms of 
adequacy, but better than Germany and the Netherlands in terms of coverage. Another cluster (made up of the UK, 
Finland and Sweden) performs above average on both counts.Page • 24
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Figure 2: Coverage and adequacy of MI schemes in the EU (poverty line at 40% median)
 
Notes:   Coverage rates from Table 4. The adequacy rate is the proportion of working age individuals entitled to MI with equivalent income 
equal or greater than 40% of the median (Table 5). Correlation coefﬁ  cient = -0. 167; p-value = 0. 567; no. of observations = 14.
Effectiveness obviously looks better against the extreme poverty benchmark (at 40 per cent of median). Lux-
embourg, closely followed by Belgium, score high (above 80 per cent) on both counts, with Poland almost making 
it. Seven countries (Finland, the UK, Sweden, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark) score progres-
sively less on coverage, but still high on adequacy, while the exact opposite is the case with Slovenia and Portugal. 
Austria and Estonia do poorly on both counts.Page • 25
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4.  Conclusions
In this paper we provided estimates of coverage and adequacy of MI in 14 EU countries using microsimula-
tion, thus offering a complementary picture to the studies based on “model families” (Immervoll 2010; Nelson 
2010; van Mechelen et al. 2011).
With respect to coverage, we have demonstrated that in several countries a large proportion of individuals of 
working age are ineligible for MI even when they fall below a poverty line set at 40 per cent of median income. 
This highlights one reason why social safety nets may be less tight than is commonly believed: eligibility rules 
limit coverage by design, either by introducing categorical conditions that exclude potential beneﬁ  ciaries, or by 
setting the income threshold for entitlement too low.
With respect to adequacy, we have shown that in some countries a large fraction of those entitled to MI remain 
at very low levels of income even when MI beneﬁ  t is added. This suggests that MI schemes are often insufﬁ  cient 
to lift people out of poverty, although naturally “they do play a very important role in reducing the intensity of 
poverty” (Frazer and Marlier, 2009).
Plotting coverage against adequacy reveals interesting patterns, partly consistent with the literature on welfare 
regimes and social assistance types. Within continental Europe, Belgium and Luxembourg appear to do far better 
than either France or Germany. Within Scandinavia, Finland and Sweden outscore Denmark in terms of coverage, 
though not in terms of adequacy (with Netherlands, an honorary member of the Scandinavian regime, showing 
up somewhere in the middle). Austria, expected to feature relatively high beneﬁ  ts but few beneﬁ  ciaries (Gough, 
2001), does marginally less poorly in terms of coverage than in terms of adequacy. The UK does rather well on 
both counts. Portugal, the only Southern European country with a comprehensive MI scheme, scores very high in 
terms of coverage with respect to a poverty benchmark at 40% of median, but quite low otherwise. Finally, among 
the Eastern European countries considered, Poland stands out, clearly outperforming Slovenia and leaving Estonia 
far behind.
Where does this all leave us? Our ﬁ  ndings suggest that the clustering of MI schemes in the 14 EU countries 
may be more complex than previous literature (Gough et al., 1997; Bahle, 2010) allowed for. If coverage and ad-
equacy are accepted as key dimensions of anti-poverty effectiveness, then variation in effectiveness seems to be 
as signiﬁ  cant within Gough’s social assistance regimes as it is between them. Clearly, some of the divergence can 
be explained by later developments (e.g. the successful launch of RMG in Portugal), while the fact that the set of Page • 26
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countries examined here is different may also have played a role. Still, some divergence remains, and can only be 
attributed to our use of a methodology that makes it possible to paint a more nuanced picture.
Moreover, the apparently reasonable notion that coverage and adequacy must be strongly and positively corre-
lated with each other (as countries move along a continuum from rudimentary to comprehensive social safety nets) 
is actually not borne out here. We have found that the correlation between our two dimensions of effectiveness 
is weak and negative (and very far from being statistically signiﬁ  cant). Hence, while some countries offer better 
coverage and more adequate MI beneﬁ  ts than others, elsewhere in the EU an implicit trade off seems to be present: 
while some countries have opted for narrowly targeted but relatively generous MI support, others have chosen the 
exact opposite. Clearly, more research into the nature and the causes of this intriguing pattern is needed.
Finally, our results conﬁ  rm that recent developments have not led to institutional conformity (Nelson, 2008), 
nor to a convergence of social protection in the EU (Caminada et al., 2010). In the light of this diversity, the recent 
legislative proposal that MI schemes across the EU ought to clear the standard poverty threshold at 60 per cent of 
median income (European Parliament, 2010) looks remarkably ambitious.
As Immervoll (2010) has pointed out, the current economic downturn is bound to boost demand for minimum 
income protection throughout the EU. Increasing shares of non-standard workers, and reductions in the scope of 
unemployment beneﬁ  ts, imply that many of those losing their job in the recession may be ineligible for standard 
unemployment insurance. As a result, beneﬁ  ts of last resort such as minimum incomes will become the main (per-
haps even the only) social safety net for large numbers of people.
This raises several issues at once. Perhaps paradoxically, minimum income beneﬁ  ts perform better in the 
context of a well-functioning labour market and a strong welfare state than when they are “the only game in town” 
(Ferrera, 2005). In this sense, the wisdom of a general shift to means-tested beneﬁ  ts, such as that experienced in 
some countries over the last few decades (Gilbert, 2004; Gough et al., 1997; Schuknecht and Tanzi, 2005), may 
have to be questioned, and the relative roles of social insurance and social assistance reconsidered (Nelson, 2004). 
In the meantime, policy makers will have to ensure that an effective safety net is in place to stop those losing their 
job (or otherwise experiencing a signiﬁ  cant drop in income) from descending into poverty (Figari et al., 2011).
The evidence presented here suggests that the current crisis will put MI schemes in several EU countries to 
a severe test. To meet the challenge, social safety nets must become stronger and tighter. MI schemes can act as 
efﬁ  cient social shock absorbers and play a counter-cyclical role by boosting internal demand and consumption, so 
long as extending coverage and/or improving adequacy are part of the agenda.Page • 27
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